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Western Caucasus among the Cherkesses by Byzantine, Russian and Latin influence. It was not until the sixteenth century, when Turkish influence was strong in the Caucasus, and when the Russians were approaching from the north, that religion, as a political force, became a serious issue.

The relations between the Turks and the Cherkesses, Kabardans and Abkhazians were confined to the exchange of merchandise for slaves and raw materials. Such relations were mutually beneficial, for while the Turks obtained from the Caucasus brave recruits for their Janissary Corps and beautiful wives for their harîms, the young men of the mountains grasped eagerly at the opportunity of a brilliant military career in foreign lands, and the young women forwent with little misgiving the hard domesticity of the mountain huts for the lives of luxurious ease which lay beyond the slave-markets of Trebizond, Akhaltsikh or Constantinople. Militarily the Turks made no attempt to force their hegemony on the mountain tribes, while the latter for their part would have been quick to resent any encroachment on their independence. If Islam spread among the mountaineers, Cherkesses, Kabardans and Abkhazians, it was rather the result of casual but continuous contact with the Mussulman merchants and sailors than of any deliberate policy of proselytisation on the part of the Turks. And it was an easy faith, in the practice of which were mingled many old pagan superstitions and forgotten rites of Zoroastrian and Christian, and which lay as lightly on the mountaineers as had Christianity during the period of Bagratid influence. Klaproth, commenting on the propagation of the Muhammadan faith among the Kabardans during the latter half of the eighteenth century, remarks that "the Porte had endeavoured to spread the religion of Mohammed by means of ecclesiastical emissaries. . . . Their [the Kabardans'] *mullahs* or priests are generally freedmen of the princes or *usden* who go to the Tatars of Tabasseran or to Ender, where they learn to read and write a little, assume the title of *Effendi*, and return to their native country to instruct the people in the Mohammedan faith, and to detach them more and more from the connection with Russia." [1]

In Daghestan Islam had been maintained and consolidated, since the days of the Arabs, by constant contact with the Persians and Tatars of Shirvan. The Daghestanli were for the most part Sunni and, at times, vented their fanaticism on the Shiah townsmen of Derbend and Shemakha.

[1] Klaproth, p. 317.

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At that time anti-Russian feeling was strong in England
and a number of fantastic propositions for the dismemberment
175 of the Muscovite Empire were being published. So influential
648 a man as Lord Stratford de Redcliffe advocated the creation
of an independent Circassia at the time of the Treaty of Paris,
and in 1862 a number of enthusiastic public meetings at Dundee,
Preston and elsewhere welcomed Cherkess deputies, who had
come to England to petition the intervention of the Queen.
But these efforts were of no avail. The Kars and Ingur
campaigns had convinced responsible British statesmen that
it was too late to attempt to retard the Russian absorption of
the Caucasus, and the Treaty of Paris, by ignoring "the Cir-
cassian Question," gave the sanction of Europe to the Russian
175 position in those regions.

[668] In 1859 Shamil, deserted by his followers, and surrounded
[59] by Russian forts, was driven from his last stronghold, Veden.
Accompanied only by a hundred faithful *murtazeks*, he fled to
the mountainous aul of Gunib in Southern Daghestan, where
he subsequently surrendered.[1] The war-weary mountaineers
had everywhere laid down their arms; the Russian conquest
of the Eastern Caucasus was complete.

175 Five years later, in 1864, the last resistance of the Cherkesses
727 and Abkhazians was crushed. Nearly 500,000 of these un-
fortunate people, together with 100,000 Chechens, emigrated
subsequently to Turkey, where the greater number died of
disease and starvation.[2] They left their mountain homes a
desert, but their place was gradually filled by Bohemian and
Cossack immigrants.

During the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–8 there was some
unrest amongst the remnants of the western tribes, but Turkish
attempts to raise a general insurrection of the Mussulman
mountaineers were ineffectual. As a result of the war, the
Russians, by the Treaty of Berlin (1878), obtained almost
the last remaining areas inhabited by the Caucasian races,
Batum and the Ajar hills.

[1] After exile at Kaluga and Kiev, he died on a pilgrimage, at Medina, in 1871.

[2] Some thousand Cherkesses—Chapsughs, Ulikhs, Kabardans and Abkhazians
[66] —are settled in the vilayet of Sivas, others in that of Bitlis. The Chechens,
after causing much trouble in the vilayets of Kars and Erzerum, finally scattered
about the region of Bitlis, Van and Mush, while others settled in the vilayet of
Diarbakr.

2 [i.e., during the Crimean War -- Analyst]

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[1811-1917]

of their youths had been drawn to the oil-wells at Maikop, Grozni and Baku, and those who remained were no match for disciplined troops armed with rifles and machine-guns. After the Young Turkish Revolution of 1908 an effort was made by the many Caucasians in Turkey to revivify the hostility to the Russian Government, and an "Association of Political Émigrés from the Caucasus in Turkey" was formed at Constantinople, to be replaced later by a "Committee of the Caucasus." The movement was no doubt encouraged by the Young Turkish Government as a part of their general Pan-Turanian—Pan-Islamic policy, but it had little strength or significance.

The War and the Revolution (1914–17).—On the outbreak of the European War the Young Turks made an attempt to detach from Russia some of the Caucasian national groups. The attempt was to a great extent abortive. The Social Democratic leaders of opinion in the Caucasus were in theory loyal to the Empire. A Georgian, a certain Leo Kerezelidze, did indeed form a "Committee for the Liberation of Georgia" at Constantinople, which proceeded to sign a secret treaty with Turkey, but it was entirely unrepresentative of any Georgian political group. Among the Muhammadan mountain-tribes the Turks found a limited degree of support. The Ajars rose in an unsuccessful attempt to support Enver's Sarikamish offensive (December 1914), and at the end of 1915 a Delegation, including the Georgian Machabeli, the Tatar Selim Beg Bebutov and two Turkish officers, Issa Pasha, a Lesghian, and Ali Fuad Pasha, a Circassian, proceeded to Berlin, to present a Memorandum demanding the assistance of the Central Powers in the formation of a quadruple Caucasian Confederation.

The outbreak of the Russian Revolution in March 1917 was welcomed with enthusiasm in the Transcaucasus. The Social Democrats, who represented the mass of public opinion, were theoretically anti-nationalist, and supported the conception of a Federated Russian Republic. Indeed the most prominent of them were interested rather in Russian than in Transcaucasian politics. A "Special Transcaucasian Committee" representing the four principal nationalities replaced the Viceroy, the Grand Duke Nicholas Nicholaevich, at Tiflis, but the real power reposed in the newly-formed Councils of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies, dominated by the Social Democrats.

As the disintegration of the central power in Russia proceeded, disunion developed in the Caucasus. The Social

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669 642 In the Transcaucasus a Social Democratic "Commissariat" had superseded the "Caucasian Committee" at Tiflis. This body, which represented all nationalities (three Georgians, three Armenians, three Tatars and two Russians) was presided over by the Georgian Gegéchkori. It drew its authority from a "Transcaucasian Seim" composed of the Caucasian members of the recently elected All-Russian Constituent Assembly, with the further addition of two members for each original one, the various parties increasing their membership in proportion to the last election figures. Further, the Commissariat and Seim worked in conjunction with the various Workmen's, Soldiers' and Municipal Councils, and with Georgian, Armenian and Tatar "National Committees."

In spite, however, of this inevitable organisation on nationalist lines, the Commissariat still endeavoured to maintain the co-operation of the different races and the principle of unity with Russia; and at the Georgian National Congress in November 1917 the Georgian Social Democratic leaders Jordania and Chenkeli emphasised these principles.

VI

RECENT HISTORY

726 ● 648 As in Russia, the most urgent necessity for Georgia was the conclusion of an early peace. The Turkish commander on the Turko-Caucasian front, Ferik Mehmed Vehib Pasha, proposed a cessation of hostilities at the beginning of December, in accordance with the action of the German General Staff on the Polish front, and on December 14 General Prjevalski, who still held nominal command of the Russo-Caucasian troops, signed an armistice at Erzinjan. During the following month the anarchy behind the Russian lines increased. Turkish agents were active in the Muhammadan districts of Transcaucasia, encouraging the Tatars and Ajars to attack the disorganised bodies of Russian troops who were making their way home through Transcaucasia. Armenian bands were attacking Turkish villages in the Russian area, and were preparing a desperate resistance to the Turkish advance.

In mid-January 1918 the Ottoman Government made a further *démarche*, addressing itself now to the "Independent Transcaucasian Government," which it invited to participate in the Brest-Litovsk negotiations. It was a development of the Turkish policy, revealed at the outbreak of war, of constructing

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a buffer-State in the Caucasus. But the Social Democrats were still loyal to their ideal of a Federal Russia, and demanded a respite " in order to combine their action with the opinions and views of other autonomous Governments in Russia." [1] They then communicated with the Ukrainian Rada at Kiev and with the South-eastern Union at Ekaterinodar. Meanwhile the Turkish Command emphasised the urgency of a settlement by a general advance, under pretext of protecting the Mussulman population behind the Russian lines from the attacks of the Armenians.

In the middle of February Turkish troops reoccupied Erzinjan (February 12), Baiburt (February 14) and Trebizond (February 24). Nevertheless, when the Seim met on February 23, all parties, including even the Tatars, maintained their attitude of co-operation with the non-Bolshevist parties in Russia, and of refusal to participate with the Bolsheviks in the negotiations at Brest-Litovsk. On March 1 they agreed on the four heads of a peace settlement which provided for the restoration of the frontiers of 1914 and the creation of an autonomous Armenia " within the frame of the Turkish State."

Next day the Tiflis Government received a telegram from the Bolshevist Commissary Karakhan, announcing the retrocession to Turkey of the districts of Batum, Ardahan and Kars. The Transcaucasian Government protested that any treaty " signed without its consent " was " void of international importance," and repeated its willingness to discuss a settlement on the basis of the proposals of March 1. But the Turkish Government replied that the cession of the territories in question had been completed, while the Transcaucasus, according to the statements of its own Government, was a part of Russia, and insisted on the immediate evacuation of the ceded districts. The Turkish Command immediately undertook a double offensive against Erzerum and Batum. Armenian troops and volunteers, under General Nazarbekian and the partisan leaders Antranik and Murad, offered a desperate resistance. But the Georgian troops, under General Odichelidze, unwilling to exhaust their strength in the defence of the Turkish Armenian districts, withdrew. On March 11 the Turks entered Erzerum; during the following month they reoccupied the remaining districts of Turkish Armenia, and approached Kars by Olti and Sarikamish. At the same time the Mussulmans rose in the Province of Kars. All communications were cut, and the

[1] Doc. & Mat., Nos. 15–25.

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insurgents seized Ardahan and Merdenik, while the panic-stricken Christian population fled towards Batum or Akhaltsikh.

Further, there was serious friction between the Georgian and Armenian commanders, the former hesitating to co-operate seriously in the defence of the Kars line. Nevertheless, when the Seim met on March 11 the Armenian and Georgian groups still worked together. Jordania opposed the Brest concessions. The Tatars, however, had already committed themselves definitely to a Turkish orientation, and it was evident that they were no longer willing to co-operate in the maintenance of Transcaucasian unity. A week later occurred the Mussavetist attempt to overthrow the Soviet at Baku, and with the departure of the Mussavetist leaders for Elisavetpol the Transcaucasian Seim lost the last semblance of control over the Eastern districts.

During the latter part of March and the beginning of April a Transcaucasian Delegation under the presidency of Mr. Chenkeli was negotiating at Trebizond with the Turkish plenipotentiary Khalil Bey. Chenkeli, more conscious at Trebizond than the Government at Tiflis of the desperate situation, at last agreed to recognise the Brest Treaty. The Turks thereupon pressed for a declaration of Transcaucasian independence, and on April 13 delivered a forty-eight hours' ultimatum. The Seim was still unwilling to yield, and the Delegation was recalled to Tiflis. On April 14 the Turks entered Batum after a feeble resistance. They then advanced to Notanebi and Ozurgeti. On April 27 they occupied Kars. The situation was desperate. The Government of Gegéchkori resigned, and Chenkeli, who had advocated the concessions, succeeded, and proclaimed the Independence of Transcaucasia.

But the Turks immediately advanced fresh demands. They now had plans far more ambitious than the restoration of the territories lost in 1878. They were in communication with the Tatar National Committee of Elisavetpol, and with a delegation from the Union of Mountaineers which had come to Trebizond. And they conceived an advance on Baku and the extension of their power over all Azerbaijan, Daghestan and North-west Persia. They therefore demanded the surrender of the Alexandropol-Julfa railway-line, "so as to prevent a British concentration in Azerbaijan," [1] and began an attack on the Armenians at Alexandropol. On May 15 Alexandropol fell, and the Turks subsequently occupied Elisavetpol (June 1) and Tabriz (June 15).

[1] *New Europe*, December 28, 1918.

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The Georgian Social Democratic Republic (*May* 1918–20).—726 While the Turks and the Tatars were attacking the Armenians 648 in the region of Alexandropol, Erivan and Kara Bagh, the Transcaucasian Government continued at Batum negotiations for a definite peace with Turkey. The interests of the Armenians and Georgians were now widely divergent, for whilst the very existence of the former was threatened by a Turkish control of the Eastern Caucasus, the latter, from their geographical position, were able to regard the Turkish menace with fewer misgivings, and were only anxious to save themselves from becoming involved in further hostilities. Thus, while the Armenian National Committee at Erivan directed an exclusive policy, the Transcaucasian Government at Tiflis tended more definitely each week to represent Georgian interests alone.

But Khalil Bey, at Batum, showed no intention of allowing the Georgians to assume a neutral attitude towards the Armeno-Turkish war. He demanded the right "to bring military help" to prevent the formation of bands in Transcaucasian territory; control of the railways and of Russian ships in Transcaucasian ports; free passage for Turkish troops and military stores through Transcaucasian territory; and immediate demobilisation of all the armed forces at the disposal of the Transcaucasian Government. Further, he patronised Mussulman delegations from the districts of Akhaltsikh and Akhalkalaki, who petitioned for annexation to Turkey. Meanwhile the Bolshevist dictator at Baku, Shaumian, an Armenian, was organising a Red Army of Russian and Armenian workmen, with the professed intention of marching on Tiflis and destroying "that nest of Menshevist reaction." And in the maritime region Bolshevist ships of the Black Sea Fleet bombarded Sukhum and other watering-places, while a Bolshevist force marched along the coast and occupied Sochi, Gagri and Sukhum.

In this situation the Transcaucasian Government commenced to negotiate for German intervention through the medium of the German representative at Batum, General v. Lossow. The German Government at this time had differences with the Porte on questions of general military policy, and was anxious to check Turkish aggression in the Caucasus, in order to secure the transference of Turkish troops to the Syrian front. During April the Germans had occupied Odessa, Nikolaev and Sevastopol, and had seized the bulk of the Black Sea Fleet. Accordingly they were soon in a position to intervene effectively. On May 25 8,000 German troops under General Kress v. Kressenstein landed at Poti, and German

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726 pickets appeared on all the frontiers of Georgia. On the same day the Transcaucasian Seim voted its own dissolution, and in the evening Jordania announced the declaration of the Independence of the Georgian Republic. Three days later an agreement was concluded at Poti between v. Lossow and Chenkeli, by which the railways and all naval tonnage were ceded to Germany for the duration of the war. By a later agreement, signed at Batum, the Georgian Government guaranteed to Turkey the free transit of petroleum by the pipe-line from Baku to Batum.

726 The apologia of the Georgian Social Democrats for the German Agreement is set forth in a memorandum to the International Socialist Bureau: "We tried to unite the Transcaucasian peoples to defend the whole of the country. But our attempt was broken by the national hatred of the Armenians and Tatars, which was rending Transcaucasia. . . . We remained alone, in a ring of fire, surrounded by enemies on all sides. The Turks marched on us from west and south, the Bolsheviks menaced from the north, and the Tatars from the east. . . . Germany alone was able to tear us away from the noose of the Turkish agreement on the condition that we handed over to her the control of our railway system. . . . No other means remained to deliver us from the Turkish occupation. Our sovereignty as to the railways was, anyhow, destroyed by our defeat. And we signed the Treaty with the Germans, gave them our railways, received their regiments, on the sole condition—which they fulfilled—to defend us from Turkey and not to interfere with our internal affairs. However," they add, "during the darkest days, when German help was most needed, we did not renounce the right of pitilessly criticising German Imperialism."

The German occupation undoubtedly saved Georgia from anarchy, while the diplomatic support of the German mission allowed the Tiflis Government to pursue a policy, in relation particularly to Armenia, which was scarcely consonant with its "pitiless criticism of German Imperialism." During the spring a military force had been organised at Tiflis round the nucleus of a body of armed workmen, and was styled "The National Guard." This body, after wavering for some time between Bolshevism and a Chauvinistic form of Nationalism, was finally persuaded by its leaders to devote itself to the defence and other interests of the Georgian Republic. The first campaign of the young army was the invasion and occupation of the Armenian part of the Borchalu district,

½ D.C., on May 28, 1918 -- Analyst]

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Akhalkalaki, and the circuit of Phambak in the government of Alexandropol, on the pretext that Armenia was "unable to build a viable State." When the Erivan Government protested to v. Kressenstein, he replied that "Germany as an ally had engaged itself to support the Georgian claims." [1]

On the north the revival of the Volunteer Army, during the late summer of 1918, enabled the National Guard to drive the Bolsheviks from Sukhum, Gagri and Sochi, and to occupy the mountain districts of the Abkhazians and Ossets, with all the western and central passes of the Caucasus, including the Mamison and Daryal, controlling respectively the Ossetian and Georgian Military Roads.

The conclusion of the armistice in November 1918 greatly modified the situation in Transcaucasia. While the Germans and Turks withdrew respectively from Georgia and Azerbaijan, the British assumed control of Batum and Baku and the line of the Transcaucasian Railway, while the Armenians proceeded to occupy Alexandropol, Kars, Ardahan and Ardanuch.

Three distinct influences must be considered in relation to the situation: (1) the mutual relations of the three national Republics; (2) The attitude of the Russian counter-revolutionary Government at Ekaterinodar; and (3) the policy of the Entente Powers.

(1) Although circumstances now favoured the Armenians, they were so exhausted by the struggle of the preceding year that the Turks at Erzerum and the Tatars at Baku still remained a real menace to their safety. Nevertheless on their Georgian frontier they undertook an offensive against Akhalkalaki and Shulaveri, with the object of regaining the territories occupied by the Georgians during the summer. The Armenians gained some initial successes, but an armistice was imposed by the Allied authorities and the ultimate allocation of the disputed territories was left to the decision of the Peace Conference at Paris. In Tiflis the Armenian offensive and the hostile attitude of the Volunteer Army on the northern frontier proved the occasion of a cruel persecution of the considerable Russian and Armenian element. During January 1919 numbers of Russians and Armenians were assaulted in the streets, and the military capacity of the National Guard was demonstrated in the systematic looting of houses in the Armenian quarter.

During the following months however the Georgian Government made a genuine effort to reconcile national differences

[1] *New Russia*, ii, 23, July 8, 1920.

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and to bring about a degree of co-operation between the national Governments. Various proposals were made for the convocation of a conference of the Transcaucasian States, but the hostility between Baku and Erivan continued to obstruct the conclusion of any common political agreement. However, the signature of the Railway and Postal Convention between the three Governments in the autumn of 1919 was hailed as the first step towards the establishment of a Transcaucasian Confederation.

(2) The counter-revolutionary leaders at Ekaterinodar bore almost as much animosity against the Georgian Socialists as against the Bolsheviks. On the other hand the Georgian Socialists did not hesitate to stigmatise the "Tsarist Generals" as reactionaries—although Mr. Gegéchkori had, in an interview with General Alexeiev, stated that "within our borders the struggle against Bolshevism is implacable"—and they further asserted a series of claims as to the possession or "self-determination" of the Sochi district. Finally, in March 1919, Denikin prepared to make an end of the Caucasian nationalist movement. On the Black Sea coast he occupied Sochi, and the Georgians retired behind the Bzib. At the same time a Russian force occupied Temir-Khan-Shura and brought to an end the "Republic of the Mountaineers."

(3) The policy of the Allies in the Caucasus had been governed by the broader consideration of the Russian Revolutionary question as a whole. While supporting the Russian counter-revolutionaries they had at the same time acquiesced in, or encouraged, the formation of autonomous governments among the border peoples. These, in principle, they were unwilling to recognise as independent, although there was a strong influence in the direction of Allied—particularly of British—policy, which favoured the erection and consistent support of a belt of independent border States. Denikin's attack on the Caucasian Republics provoked a protest from the British Black Sea Command. A small British force was landed at Gagri, between the Volunteer troops at Sochi and the Georgians near Pitsunda, and Denikin, who was dependent on British support in the campaign against the Bolsheviks, was constrained to stop his offensive.

A result of Denikin's offensive was a further effort of the Georgian Government to organise a Transcaucasian alliance—if not a confederation. On July 16, 1919 a Military Convention was signed between Georgia and Azerbaijan, with the object of combined defensive action against the Volunteer Army. But

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Erivan, careful of offence to the Allies, and fearing a Turko-Tatar rather than a Russian attack, held aloof.

In the autumn of 1919 the combination against Denikin developed into a formidable rising of the Daghestanli Khans, which was certainly subsidised and abetted by the Azerbaijan Government. Levies were raised to the number of about 30,000, including 1,000 Turkish *askars*, and organised by fugitive Turkish officers and Tatars, ex-officers of the Imperial Army. In conjunction with Bolshevist elements from Astrakhan the insurgents attacked Derbend and Petrovsk, and threatened other towns. Denikin, at a critical moment, was therefore forced to withdraw two Cossack divisions with armoured cars from the front in Central Russia, but he was successful after a few weeks' campaign in subduing the Khans.

In August the British evacuated all points in Transcaucasia except Batum. A first consequence of this action was a closer Turko-Tatar *rapprochement*, and a desire on the part of the Armenian Government, manifested in a Treaty of Arbitration (November 18), to arrive at a closer understanding with Georgia.

At the beginning of 1920 the collapse of the Volunteer Army and the advance of the Bolsheviks into the Kuban caused the Georgian Government to make one last attempt to achieve some form of co-operation among the Transcaucasian States. The Prime Ministers of Armenia and Azerbaijan were induced to meet and discuss the vexed Zangezur question. But the Tatars were attracted by the prospect of a military alliance with the Turkish Nationalist Government against the Armenians, and concentrated their troops in the Zangezur region. On April 27 the Bolsheviks seized Baku.

The relations of the Tiflis Government with Moscow had, until Denikin's collapse, been normal. Chicherin had, in fact, proposed a Georgian attack on Denikin at the beginning of January. But Gegéchkori had professed disinterestedness in the Russian Civil War, and had refused to permit Georgia to become involved in "a military adventure which would be far beyond her strength." Further negotiations had then taken place, and peace had been agreed upon in principle. But the Bolshevist Staff was notoriously independent of Moscow, and Georgia might expect an immediate attack. During April indeed the Bolsheviks occupied the Gagri district in spite of Georgian protests and raided the Gori district from the north. On May 1 there was a Bolshevist outbreak at Tiflis.

The Polish War however, induced the Bolsheviks to suspend all aggression in the East. Consequently a Treaty was signed

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at Moscow (June 12) by which the Soviet Government recognised the independence of Georgia, and disclaimed all interest in the internal affairs of that country. Georgia was to receive Batum, should it be evacuated by the British, and a neutral zone was established on each side of the Caucasian Mountains. But the cynical attitude of the Bolsheviks towards the Treaty, which they regarded as merely of a temporary nature, was indicated by the correspondence of Chicherin with Mustafa Kemal Pasha, in which he approved the latter's proposal to decide by plébiscite the future of Batum and other regions.

While the Moscow negotiations were in progress the Supreme Council had decided on the evacuation of Batum, and at the beginning of July 1920 the Franco-British troops were withdrawn. The Georgians had already occupied Artvin (May 6), and on July 9 the control of Batum was formally transferred to them by the British High Commissioner, Colonel Stokes.

The evacuation of Batum by the Allies was significant of their intention to abstain from all active intervention in Transcaucasia. Georgia and Armenia were left to their own resources. The situation in the two countries became extremely critical during the autumn of 1920. The people were demoralised by the long period of political crises. In Georgia economic life was disorganised by the unfavourable rate of exchange with Europe, by the impossibility of resuming normal relations with the Northern Caucasus and Azerbaijan, and by the uncertainty of the supply of oil-fuel from Baku. In Armenia the peasants were disheartened by the delay in the solution of the Turkish Armenian question, and the productive capacity of the country was strained to an extreme limit by the necessity of supporting hundreds of thousands of refugees. Thousands of deaths from malnutrition and exposure were occurring, and cholera and typhus were ravaging the crowded villages.

It was patent to all observers that both countries must succumb to a vigorous attack. Their continued independence depended on the preoccupation of the Bolsheviks in other quarters.

In November the conclusion of the Polish War and the unexpected collapse of the White Army in the Crimea precipitated the crisis. The Bolsheviks were now free to despatch troops to the Transcaucasus. At the same time the fall of Venizelos and the political changes in Greece permitted the Turks to withdraw troops from the Smyrna front for despatch to Erzerum. In the middle of September they commenced operations in the regions of Kars and Igdir, and in November the movement

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developed formidable proportions. The demoralised Armenians lacked munitions, uniforms and food, and further, they could hope for no help from the Allies. Kars fell, almost without a shot, and the inhabitants of Erivan only avoided a Turkish occupation by the establishment of a Soviet and recognition of the authority of the Moscow Government.

The Georgians were in a precarious position. Sporadic Bolshevist outbreaks occurred at Tiflis and Batum, and further, the Georgians appear to have been disheartened by the attitude of the British Government, who during the negotiations at Genoa with the Soviet Government appeared to ignore the interests of the Caucasian Governments, and failed to make any suggestion that they should be recognised by the Soviet Government or even to stipulate for their immunity from immediate attack. When the Armenians were attacked the Georgian Government hesitated to make any effort to assist them, and confined themselves, after the Turks had taken Kars and Alexandropol, to occupying the Armenian towns of Ardahan and Ardanuch, officially as a friendly and protective measure.

In the middle of February the Bolsheviks commenced an attack on Georgia. Armenian troops moved on Shulaveri, while a strong force of Bolshevist cavalry advanced up the valley of the Kur towards Tiflis, and detachments crossed the Mamison and Daryal Passes. At the same time another Bolshevist force advanced from Gagri towards Sukhum. The Armenian thrust was repulsed, but the force moving along the Kur was supported by a Bolshevist rising of Russian and Armenian elements in Tiflis, and the Georgian defence was disorganised by the defection of part of the National Guard. In the last week of February Tiflis fell, and the Georgian Government withdrew to Kutais. At the beginning of March the Bolsheviks occupied Mtzkhet and Gori.

Meanwhile the Nationalist Turks occupied Ardahan, Ardanuch and Artvin by agreement with the Georgians, and on March 9 entered Batum.

The Turko-Georgian understanding did not, however, modify the situation. A Georgian rally on the Suram ridge had been expected. But while the Bolshevist Black Sea force took Sukhum and Poti, the Kur army entered Kutais, and the Government of Jordania fled on board an Italian warship at Batum. On March 17 the Bolsheviks approached that town. The Georgian Government troops then deserted to the Bolsheviks, and attacked the small Turkish detachment, which was forced to withdraw.

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The Bolsheviks subsequently[1] established Soviets at Batum and Tiflis under the leaders of Georgian Bolshevism, and a Treaty was signed between Angora and Moscow, which confirmed the Turkish occupation of Ardahan, Artvin and Kars, and guaranteed to the Turks free goods transit to Batum.

Following the Kars Conference (October–November 1921), which regulated the relations of the Angora Government and the Caucasian Bolshevist Governments, confirmed the Turks in the possession of Kars and Ardahan, and established a special régime for the Batum Provinces, the Soviet Government abolished by decree the independence of the three Soviet Republics of Transcaucasia, and established one federal union under Russian control, with a political capital at Baku—the centre of Bolshevist influence—and an economic capital at Tiflis. It should be added that the representatives of the four exiled Caucasian Governments (Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Daghestan) have also "concluded an alliance and established an understanding" by an agreement signed in Paris on June 10, 1921, providing for co-ordination of foreign policy, compulsory arbitration in disputes, and a Customs Union.

In general the situation indicates the development of a further phase of the Russian Revolution—the failure of the separatist movement of the border races and the reconstruction of the Russian Imperial unit through the agency of the Bolshevist military machine. Such a consummation in the Caucasus was, perhaps, inevitable. For the history of the last four years has demonstrated the political instability and military weakness of the national States. And from the standpoint of Russian Imperial policy the re-establishment of control over the Caucasus was a strategic and economic necessity.

Thus for reasons political, economic and moral, it is unquestionable that the future of the Transcaucasian peoples must lie in intimate union with Russia. The actual form of association between Russia and the Transcaucasians, as also the other border races, still remains to be evolved. But it is to be hoped that a liberal autonomy will allow to Georgians, Tatars, Armenians and Mountaineers alike the opportunity for prosperous economic development, and for the preservation of their individual characteristics. In an age of standardisation the distinctive cultures of ancient races are at once a source of advantage to civilisation and of delight to the individual.

[1] [for events preceding the settlement of 1921, see cent. 116, p 215 ff.—Analyst]

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HISTORICAL SETTING

*175 Although the Caucasus is considered to be one of the ancient centers of the Eastern Hemisphere, its known history is relatively short and embraces hardly more than 3,000 years.

The history of the Caucasus as a whole shows several characteristics which are sometimes overlooked even by students of the area. This peculiar situation is due mostly to the fact that Caucasian history is complicated and seldom treated as a whole.

*175 ● 648 Perhaps the most important characteristic of Caucasian history is the intertwining of the history of two distinct groups. In the first group we have the great powers concentrated sometimes in the Caucasian area, but in the majority of cases having their headquarters far away from the Caucasus. To this group belong the Byzantine Empire, the Sassanian Empire, the Kazar Empire, the Arab Caliphate, the Ottoman Empire, Russia, etc. The second group consists of the so-called small powers whose main concentration has always been in the area. This group includes the Georgians, the Armenians, the Circassians, the Mountain Tribes, and the Azeri-Turks (a small power only during the last centuries), etc. The small powers in general have lived under the domination of the great powers, and with remarkable regularity,

*175 648 whenever the dominating great powers became weak or were seriously fighting with each other they entered into their independent periods, formed states with the attribute "Great", or lived in a "Golden Age."

*175 The second important characteristic of Caucasian history is that the South Caucasus and the North Caucasus did not in general form a unit. In the case of the small powers this is obvious. In the case of the great powers, however, it must be explained by the fact that the mountain chain of the Caucasus constituted a formidable dividing-line. It is very significant that the North and South Caucasus have formed a single unit only three times. The first case, or rather attempt, was the Mongolian one, in which both areas were subjugated by the Mongolians coming from the East. The second case was the Ottoman one when the North and South Caucasus were both occupied by them from the West. In other words, in both cases the expansion paralleled the Caucasian chain, which circumstance somewhat facilitated it. Yet only once, in the Russian case, did a great power succeed in dominating the whole area by a direct crossing of the chain of the Caucasus. This crossing was without doubt aided by a technology unknown to the previous periods. Even so it was a great achievement and gave the Russian occupation an outstanding and unique place in Caucasian history.

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Note on the Historical Setting of Russian Foreign Policy in the Caucasus

648 As I have already mentioned, the Russian occupation of the Caucasus started with the creation of the Vladikavkaz Corridor cutting through the North Caucasus and connecting Russia with Georgia.[1] The second phase of the Russian advance was the occupation of Georgia in the south; this was followed by the occupation of the adjacent South Caucasian areas from Georgia, and finally the occupation of the Dagestan and Circassian pockets in the North Caucasus. As a result of this occupation, Russia's drive toward the Eurasian coast gained a bridgehead in the Southern Caucasus similar in importance to that of Outer Mongolia, Afghanistan, the Balkans, or satellite East Germany.

The South Caucasian bridgehead is strikingly similar on a large scale to the Vladikavkaz Corridor. The South Caucasian bridgehead is to the Near and Middle East today what the Vladikavkaz Corridor was to the South Caucasus in the 18th and 19th centuries. Like the old one, the new corridor is located on the northern, or Russian side of a mountain range, in this case the Taurus-Zagros mountain system. Like the old one, the new corridor attempts to separate the two peoples which form the anti-Russian defense line of the Near and

1/ [cf. cat. 116, pp. 299-300, also map 38, p. 348 -- Analyst]

• 648 Middle East. Today's "Circassians" and "Mountain Tribes" are the Turks and the Persians. The countries of these two peoples: Turkey and Iran are at the same time bordered by a western, and by an eastern Russian wedge (the Balkans and the area around Afghanistan) in the same way as the Circassians and the Mountain Tribes were bordered by the Russian strips along the Black and the Caspian Seas. Thus, the new Russian offensive makes these countries potential semi-pockets. At the southern end of the South Caucasian corridor, beyond the Taurus and the Zagros, is the Arabic World. This world with all its internal quarrels and over-emphasized issues like "Western Colonialism" or Israel, shows similar features to those which were characteristic of 18-19th century Georgia, and which made it ideal as a Russian sphere of interest.

The geopolitical structure of the Caucasus makes this area one of the favored "battlefields" of Russian foreign policy, and one of the key points in the Russian plan for "World Domination." Russia's present day Caucasian policy consists of the following three elements. First, to enlarge the width, depth and strength of the South Caucasian Corridor. (To this end Georgian, Armenian, Kurdish, Azeri Turkic, Talish, and Gilak would-be-nation movements are exploited. From time to time, a Georgian, Armenian, Kurdish irrendentist movement is put in motion

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●648 against Turkey, the bastion of the Near and Middle East, or a Gilaki People's Republic, a Kurdish Republic of Mahabad, or various South Azerbaijanian Republics are created in Iran.) The second element of the Russian South Caucasian foreign policy embraces the various attempts against Turkey's and Iran's ruling peoples themselves. Among the most recent attempts, the so-called "Battle of Azerbaijan" in 1946, which brought to the fore the military aspects of Russian foreign policy, was fought against Turkey. Synchronized with the concentration of Russian troops in the Balkan area, and reinforced with Russian demands for military bases in the Straits, and the cancellation of the Russian-Turkish Friendship Treaty, the "Battle of Azerbaijan" ushered in the "Cold War." After being defeated by Turkish firmness and a reorientation of United States foreign policy, the Russians began to concentrate on Iran. The newest phase of Russo-Persian relations is an attempt at "peaceful penetration" exploiting Persian socialistic, chauvinistic, or religious disruptive forces connected with or influenced by the Persian Communist Party, the Tudeh. The third aspect of Russian Caucasian policy has to do with the Arabic areas. The Russian infiltration which has a tradition especially in Iraq and Syria has started once again with revived impetus and larger objectives. The

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•648 global results of this Russian "Arabic policy" are well known by everybody.

Though the geopolitical similarites between the South Caucasian and the Vladikavkaz Corridors are striking, it is to be hoped that Arabic-Russian cooperation will not yield Russia the same results as did Georgian-Russian cooperation a century and a half ago. Similarly, it is to be hoped that Turkey and Iran, the new pocket candidates, will be able to resist the Russian thrust with their own strength and the backing of their international alliances (NATO, Baghdad Pact) much more successfully than were the Circassians and the Mountain Tribes less than a century ago. Finally, it is to be hoped that the interested Northern Tier States will create for their own sake a solution that will take into consideration the would-be-nation movements of the area, and thus deprive Russian foreign policy of its chief tool in its attempt to enlarge its corridor in the South Caucasus.

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1935-7 people's commissar of Azerb. social security. Deputy to VS SSSR 1.-2. sozyv. 1938-1948 president of VS Azerb. SSR presidium.

BE II 20:346

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Kasumov, Salim Kasumovich
Minister of local industry, Azerb. 1954.

Bak. Rab. 3/10/54

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Katanian, R. P.
One of the signers of a letter to Pravda. One of the old members of the 1905 revolution, formerly described in Soviet propaganda as the chief of "nationalist opposition" group in Armenia. For almost a generation his name had not appeared in the official press.

NYT 3/12/56

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Kavtaradze, S. I.
(no dates, place) Order of Lenin, of Red Labor. flag. Educated in Leningr. Univ. (law degree). Engaged in revolutionary work in Baku 1903. On editorial staff of Pravda 1913-14. Return to Caucasus in 1918. Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of Georgia, 1921-22. Legal

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counselor to Turkey 1923-4; chief of Middle East Dept. of Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1941-3; deputy of Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1943-5; ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary to Rumania since 1945.

World Dipl. Dir. 1950, page 853

665 2 Kazarian, V. A.
Member CC CP Arm. SSR, 18.s'ezd 1956.

Kom. Er. 1/22/56

538 1 Kediashvili, D.
1862-1931. Georgian writer. Wrote: Solomon Morbeladze, 1894; Machekha Samanishvili, 1897; Nevzgody Kamushadze, 1900.

BE II 13:78

325 3(?) Kekelidze, Ivan Grigor'evich
Stalin prize 3. class, for work in metallurgy (1950).

Laur. Stalin. prem. 1950
p. 32

814 1 Kekelidze, Konrelii Samsonovich
1879-. Georgian academician, philologian. Wrote: Istoriia